The Foreign Policy Blob has Forgotten How to Negotiate

The outrage over Trump's Ukraine deal is a symptom of a larger problem in American diplomacy.

In the years following the end of the Cold War, the U.S. enjoyed a period of relative peace, stability, and growth now commonly referred to as the “peace dividend.” This was a time in which the U.S. was able to reallocate resources from defense spending and put them towards economic growth. This of course had a detrimental impact on our defense capabilities that we are still feeling today. But the peace dividend had another casualty: the degradation of our foreign policy establishment’s ability to conduct diplomacy.

The discourse surrounding the war in Ukraine is a symptom of this atrophy. Many of the neocons, primacists, Europhiles, Atlanticists, and the like are some of the most impacted. There is a belief amongst many of this set that supporting Ukraine until it achieves a complete victory over Russia is of paramount importance. Their argument, as a friend of mine explained recently, is that hamstringing Russia’s military capabilities in Ukraine is good for U.S. strategic objectives because it takes Russia off the chess board.

Fair enough.

But what I fail to hear is what the endgame looks like. These voices simply state the war should continue until Ukraine has retaken every square inch of its territory. Some even include Crimea in this argument, which was annexed by Russia several years before the 2022 invasion.

The problem is Ukraine has been locked in an effective stalemate with Russia since its counter offensive stalled more than a year ago. While Ukrainian forces should be applauded for their ability to hold out against a much larger Russian force, they have not demonstrated the ability to expel the Russians, much less retake Crimea. Even if Ukraine had the stronger hand, there is no serious discussion about what peace would look like in the unlikely event of a Ukrainian total victory. The discussion begins and ends at “defeat Russia at all costs,” a position which is simply outside the realm of possibility.

Such is the symptom of a foreign policy establishment that hasn’t had to negotiate a high level diplomatic agreement with a near peer competitor for more than three decades. For the most part, the foreign policy blob isn’t offering up a tangible solution because they have forgotten how negotiate with a near peer competitor. Many are unable to comprehend a diplomatic negotiation in which the U.S. isn’t holding all the cards. This is why their arguments for continuing the war are almost entirely based on vibes as opposed to hard facts.

In contrast, the Trump administration has presented Ukraine with a viable option. The latest draft proposal, as of this writing, would establish a co-managed “Reconstruction Investment Fund” that includes 50% of Ukraine’s mineral revenues and expresses U.S. intent for a long term financial commitment to Ukraine’s stability and prosperity.

While Trump’s deal doesn’t provide an outright security guarantee, it doesn’t take much reading between the lines to see that the U.S. would have a vested interest in deterring Russia from breaching Ukrainian sovereignty should it have a vested economic interest in the country. It might not be NATO membership, but it’s the best option Kiev is likely to see.

The response from many of the usual suspects has been outrage, with some going as far as claiming Trump is engaging in “extortion.” Again, this is coming from the same group of people whose only solution thus far is to continue the most deadly stalemate we have seen since World War I on the far flung hope that Ukraine will achieve a total victory in spite of the realities on the ground. This is indicative of the diplomatic atrophy problem. My former colleague Saagar Enjeti summed it up well:

“I finally understand liberal foreign policy: They would rather the U.S. virtue signal votes in the UN and talk tough about Putin rather than actually secure U.S. interests or bring peace to Ukraine.”

The reality is the vast majority of diplomatic history has centered around transactional agreements. The post Cold War neocon policies of unilaterally supporting smaller nations on the American taxpayer’s dime in defense of commonly shared ideals was entirely a benefit of the Peace Dividend and an anomaly of history. Such a strategy is not viable in the era of great power competition when a near-peer competitor like China can call into question American hegemony.

The foreign policy leaders of the last Cold War understood this well. Great diplomats like George Kennan, Henry Kissinger, and their contemporaries recognized forcing unconditional surrender was not a viable negotiation strategy when dealing with a peer adversary, especially at a time when nuclear weapons were on a hair trigger. Had the voices we hear today been listened to then, we would have likely seen the Cold War go hot and perhaps a potential nuclear exchange. It’s time our foreign policy establishment put away their hubris and relearn the art of real diplomacy.